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Abstract

Over the course of more than two millennia the Hukou System has shifted in scope and purpose.
In dynastic times it served as a mechanism of tax acquisition. In more recent years it has
functioned as a method of census and land distribution. Today it holds a duplicitous function
serving as both an economic and social control mechanism. The Hukou achieves this through
controlling movement through a passport like system of internal registration. In simpler terms,
think of the Hukou as an internal passport regulating movement while simultaneously holding all
of your biometric data which is surveilled and controlled by a centralized government institution.
This work explores the duality of this system and the effects that such a system have had on two
sub-sects of people within the PRC. In the first case study I examine the economic side of the
Hukou and the role it plays in the lives of Han economic migrants. In the second case I examine
the social-control aspect and its implementation in the Uyghur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang.
By engaging in this analysis, I show the possible outcomes of the continuance of such a system
and how it could play a larger role in global migration governance in coming years.

Keywords: Hukou System; census; social control; governmental institution; global migration
governance; People’s Republic of China; Uyghur Autonomous Region
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The Function of the Hukou System in Post-Revolutionary China & its Autonomous
Regions

Over the course of two millennia the “HS” (Hukou System) has shape-shifted in terms of
scope and purpose as it has changed dynastic and imperial hands. In the past, it has functioned as
a mechanism for tax acquisition, census development and more recently for land distribution. In
its current state the HS has taken on a duplicitous nature in order to best serve the interests of the
Chinese Communist Party, the governing body of the People’s Republic of China.
On the one hand, it is used as an economic control mechanism ensuring a clean
circumvention of the much-dreaded Lewis Turning Point among other developmental goals. On
the other, it has been used as a social control mechanism, limiting the power of citizens to
organize economically, politically or even socially. This is achieved through the control of
movement that the HS ensures through a passport-like system of governmental surveillance.
In this article, I evaluate the duplicity of this system, and the fallout of such governmental
policy. In order to do this effectively I will trace the historical origins of the HS through the
dynastic eras of China before linking those eras to the current PRC and CCP rule. In conjunction
with this I will show how the system fits in with broader dynastic and imperial goals which
requires such extensive historical context.
While the system and policies that have been born of the system have been both lauded
and condemned by the international community as well as citizens within the PRC, my goal with
this work is not so much to make a statement about the system in a positive or negative light but
rather to show the system as it functions in this duplicitous role. By doing so I will show the
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possible outcomes of a continuance of such a system and how it could play a larger role in global
migration governance as we move deeper into the 21st century.
To evaluate such a complex system, I have employed both the post-colonial and biopolitical theoretical frameworks in tandem with a historical institutionalist methodology to best
understand its implications and development over time. By using case studies to show the uses of
the HS through the lens of governmental control, the manifestations of the system as well as the
longterm effects that such a system has on a population will help western researchers understand
the potential of such a system in present and future contexts.
This analysis is crucial when looking at migration control in the coming decades as China
becomes an ever greater world power, and as global migrant populations increase due to a
myriad of phenomena. The likelihood that neighboring nations begin to take the lead from the
PRC in terms of migration control is bound to increase and therefore understanding the potential
of such a system in the global context becomes paramount to combating human rights violations
and totalitarianism within the broader global migration regime.
Literature Review
My research on the HS requires many perspectives in order to be properly addressed. Due
to the general lack of western attention to said system, outside the purview of the economic
development world, there is a relatively limited body of work dedicated to studying the system
from a human rights/global migration regime and governance perspective. The main themes of
my research rely on answering a few fundamental questions:

1.
2.

How does the Hukou System work?
Why does it function in this way?
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3.
4.

Who is affected and how are they affected?
How does it retain its legitimacy?

In order to address these questions, I first had to identify a theoretical foundation for
analyzing my findings but more fundamentally for asking the right questions regarding my topic.
After engaging with preliminary literature on the subject of the Hukou System (news reports and
general encyclopedic information) I decided that the only theoretical framework that was suitable
for analyzing such a system was the post-colonial framework made famous by scholars such as
Homi K. Bhabha, Edward Said, and Gyatri Spivak.
Unfortunately, due to the relative lack of focus on China, or Chinese systems by these
authors, it was necessary that I find a supplemental theory to help meld their foundational
theories to the subjects that remain distant from their individual focuses. That supplementary
theory happened to be Michel Foucault and his theory of bio-politics. While it was important to
discuss the role of colonialism, and post-colonial processes, in shaping the governmental
structure of the People’s Republic of China, it is more important to understand how governance
in China was expressed through its institutions and how that expression has affected vast swathes
of the Chinese population.
Institution is a key word that comes up repeatedly in my work and in the work of the
scholars I listed above. While the post-colonial thinkers, such as Said and Bhabha, focused
predominantly on nation-states and their development in the post-colonial sense, they definitely
honed in on the idea of colonialism as an institution; though perhaps they did not address it
strictly as a governmental institution.
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Said made a very prescient point in his assessment of colonial nations that ties very
closely with the heart of my argument focused around the Hukou and the PRC in his book
Orientalism. “Every single empire in its official discourse has said that it is not like all the others,
that its circumstances are special, that it has a mission to enlighten, civilize, bring order and
democracy, and that it uses force only as a last resort.” (Said 1978).
This strikes particularly true with my findings on nation-building and institutional
legitimacy in China. The building of a national mythos is crucial to sustaining manufactured
histories and institutions that are duplicitous in their nature. While on the outside one method of
application fits into this sort of national mythos, the other works subterraneously to execute more
dubious ambitions that the party or nation does not directly admit to or even address.
Bhabha and Spivak dive a little deeper into the nation-state as the seat of power—Bhabha
with culture and the evolution of groups that do not necessarily fit within the mechanisms of a
single nation-state, and Spivak with gender divides and more feminist-centered work. All three
use culture, and even points of culture such as literature, to address the role of the nation-state in
the coercion and exploitation of certain groups of people. Control is a major underlying theme,
though I argue that their focus is much more on categorization and extrapolation of identity
within the state apparatus.
This ultimately led me to the work of scholars such as Tom Cliff who have spent a lot of
time on the underlying foundations of Chinese identity today. By tapping into the histories of
Daoism and Confucianism, he has set a firm basis in his assertion that, though these philosophies
are ancient and not necessarily tied to CCP leadership, the CCP leadership does indeed use these
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modes of thinking to link much more directly to the basic Chinese identity. This then allowed
them to build a mythos surrounding a central identity structure.
Knowing this, I was quite pleased to find the work of Foucault and Giorgio Agamben to
fit in very nicely with this theme. Where they diverge, though, is in the exploration where each
looks at the nation-state but even more so at the individual institutions that these nation-states
use for legitimizing political efforts, excluding non-desirables and even controlling how their
denizens, have sex, procreate, and organize economically and politically. Points of interest for
these two researchers stretches from the education system, to hospitals, to religion and of course
the political nature of all these institutions.
But where does China fit in? What kind of research has been done in the past on
governance and control in China and where does the research come from theoretically? This was
a much more difficult question to answer. Most of the research conducted by outside researchers
is limited due to the insulated nature of China, especially when we are speaking of the early
years of PRC rule between 1949 and the mid-1980’s. As China opened up to the markets and the
West in the years leading up to the fall of the Soviet Union, most research has focused on the
economy, how it has reacted with the open market, and how China has become an economic
powerhouse.
What is not addressed due to the secrecy that shrouds many of the PRC’s institutions is
how China has exercised its power over its citizens through its institutions such as the Hukou.
The most research done in this light has been research covering the “One-child Policy” that is
now no longer implemented. The repercussions are still felt and it is obvious that China has a
vested interest in controlling the bodies of its citizens in order to achieve political and economic
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agendas often left out of the propaganda fed to the masses. This is the point where I felt Foucault
and Agamben could be of the most help to me.
Though there is little research done on the Hukou System as a whole there is one
researcher in particular that I needed in order to broach this rather murky institution. The work of
Fei-ling Wang was crucial to building the foundation of structural understanding that unmasked
many of the questions I listed at the beginning of this section. Wang sees the HS as a mechanism
of exclusion, one based on geographic location but also on ethnicity and socioeconomic status. In
his work he cites western authors such as Foucault, Agamben and Saskia Sassen, all well known
for their work surrounding state-sponsored exclusion. With this I knew I was on the right track.
Methodology
With these foundational texts listed above, I was able to extrapolate a plan, an
overarching research path and structure that would allow me to answer my major theoretical
questions surrounding the Hukou System. The only piece left to the puzzle before I could start on
my research was establishing a method for collecting my data. For this I settled on the use of
Historical Institutionalist methods that allowed me to work from the archive room due to the
limits surrounding time and access to the populations that I would be studying.
These limits to first-hand fieldwork that I have previously mentioned are three-fold.
Firstly, my ability to communicate effectively in Chinese is extremely limited. While I can
perform basic research tasks in Chinese I would not be able to lend any nuance to translations
nor complete the translations myself. I have run into this problem before when working as a
journalist. Secondly, my access to regions of interest are also severely limited. While I could
have possibly been granted research access to mainland China, I would have been closely
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monitored and would have been absolutely restricted from traveling to Xinjiang, a major
geographic focus of my research, nor would I have been allowed to conduct interviews with local
Uyghur people. Thirdly, my ability to complete all of this in a year and a half with coursework
and a job was financially and temporally impossible.
Therefore I decided to rely on the Historical Institutionalist method which utilizes case
studies (from the archives) to explore governance through institutions in a chronological fashion.
This was perfect due to my research limitations but also complementary to the Foucauldian
method of looking at events and institutions as vestiges of history that allows us to tell the stories
and analyze the “history of the present” as he called it.
Essentially, the steps that I took to collect my research centered around collecting the
proper documents to highlight each of my sections before ultimately leading into my conclusion
at the end which aims to answer the questions I listed at the beginning of this review. The first
section of my thesis revolves around explaining what the Hukou System is, how it is constructed,
and ultimately how it came to be in its present form.
To do this, I assembled the work of Fei-ling Wang (his works that have been translated)
and later merged in some contextual history around the history of China, how the PRC gained
power and ultimately how dynastic times flowed into the current expression of the Hukou
System. This section did not require much engagement with theory apart from some work that
focused on the use of Stalinist theory to develop the PRC after the Revolution of 1949.
In the following section I dove into the economics of the Hukou System and the first
expression of a duality that the PRC uses to justify the continuance of the Hukou System in its
entirety. To do this I collected work from the economist Arthur A. Lewis on the so aptly named
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“Lewis Turning Point”. Combining this with data on the economic transition of the 1980’s during
the Deng Xiaoping era, I was able to trace a line of economic development to the point where the
LTP becomes a concern of the CCP leadership and consequently acts as the major propaganda
driver of why the Hukou System is necessary. It is the first side of the duality that I mentioned
earlier but it is not the complete picture.
In the second part of the thesis I dive into the more dubious side of the HS and how it is
being utilized as a system of surveillance and repression for the ethnic minorities of Xinjiang but
also on the “floating migrants” that make up a vital subsection of the present economy. Both are
disenfranchised, but both are disenfranchised in different ways. To explore Xinjiang and the
Uyghur people I engaged with news reports coming from the region revolving around the
detention and re-education camps that the PRC has placed Uyghur muslims in over the past
couple of years. Before doing that I needed to establish a historical context for relations between
Xinjiang and Beijing.
Ildiko Beller-Hann and Jacob Jacobson served as two major resources for exploring this.
By collecting testimonies from tribal leaders over the late 19th and 20th centuries Beller-Hann
was able to show the types of correspondence between the two bodies and how these relations
persist today even through governmental change and ultimately revolution. Jacobson on the other
hand gives a more contemporary account of life in Xinjiang and the sort of colonial measures
Beijing has taken to inject ethnic Han people into the region where they occupy a majority of
high-level jobs both within the energy sector and government.
While much of the data I pulled comes from the Bureau of Statistics (not always trustworthy) I did my best to balance the data with other sources so as to give a fuller picture of the
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sort of shifts that might not be acknowledged by the central government. All of this was done in
order to reach my final conclusion where I really begin to employ the work of the theorists I
mentioned in the beginning.
Post-colonial theory and the work of Said, is important for understanding the vestiges of
colonial tactics in China. Bio-politics and the literature surrounding it is crucial to breaking down
the institutional practice of controlling people’s bodies and movements. While the historical
institutionalist method might not be the absolute perfect methodology for exploring this
particular subject, it is the only one that I could work out with my linguistic, temporal, and
geographic limitations.
Part I: Origin & Development of the Hukou System
“Modern power is not only negative and repressive but also positive and productive,
circulating widely in and through the state, the institution of modern society and society
itself.” (Greenhalgh, Winckler 2000).
The role of exclusion in statecraft is prominent in one way or another throughout history.
Each nation at some point in its history via their development of institutions, laws, and policies,
systematically disenfranchise certain populations as a means to a political end. In the United
States, the vestiges of racism still remain within the justice system and permeate throughout
other facets of society as well. In China, one facet of governance that perpetuates this same sort
of exclusion is the HS. Despite this, it is important to understand its historical origins, its original
and more creative uses and how it morphed into the current system of exclusion that I discuss in
the second section of this piece. What must be kept in mind is that while some forms of
institutional exclusion are effective and lauded by some; they are resented and actively fought
against by others. (Wang 2010).

14 of 63
The reason I bring this up is to keep in mind throughout this expository section that while
some systems are devised for simple reasons, they can often be utilized in more complex and
politically creative ways. This is why it is important to understand origins, image and the
conjunctive fluidity of politics and society. The HS has proven throughout my research to have
many names and faces with sometimes unified and divergent wills guiding its use and
development. By understanding it along a historical timeline it becomes impossible to view state
institutions as static and it forces readers to come to grips with the role narrative-building plays
in the form and function of any government institution.
It is important to mention and understand the importance of time and tradition as catalysts
that allow exclusive policies to be implemented and maintained over centuries. Given enough
time these policies can begin to permeate culture and tradition and therefore gain nationwide
acceptance by the majority who are favored by such policy.
While it may make sense to say that the opposite can be said for those that are
disadvantaged by such policies, we must remember that time and repetition wears most objection
or means of resistance down. Not to mention, the innate power dynamics that allow such policies
to survive also greatly impact the populations of the disadvantaged and wear down their
resistance too, oftentimes through the development of mere ambivalence. Time, therefore, is of
the essence in the development and legitimization of behavior-shaping human institutions,
including institutional exclusions.
One central difference we must consider as western researchers is the fact that this
migration regulation differs greatly from our own in one major way. This regulation and
restriction is internal. By regulating migration within the borders of China and breaking down
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the population based on geographic location (often tied to ethnicity and social status) the HS has
ingrained institutional exclusion that can not be readily interfered with by outside observers. It is
generally within the rights of each state to do as they please with regard to policy and even when
there are mass violations of human rights as there are in the PRC there is little that the outside
world can do to change the way things are. This is especially true within the current
supranational governmental structures that exist today.
Rural and small-town residents are the ones that suffer most within the present Hukou
regime, not to mention those in the borderlands or what are paradoxically named the autonomous
regions of China. In the same way that gerrymandering disaffects many voters in key pockets of
the country within the US context, the same can be said for those that find themselves excluded
from the bounty that are the urban centers scattered throughout mainland China. Something to
keep in mind though, despite the problems, discussed in this article, associated with the HS, the
system itself still retains a remarkable amount of institutional legitimacy and administrative
effectiveness, especially since its communist overhaul post-1949. (Wang 2010).
A central question that is present throughout much of my research revolves around what I
refer to as national identity or “national psychology”. How has a system as potentially divisive as
the HS survived the millennia? How has it maintained institutional legitimacy both within the
CCP government as well as the broader non-political population. These sub-questions get at the
main reason for my historical perspective when diving into this research and in the conclusion of
this article I will grapple with these questions more directly.
The HS has been around in one form or another since the time of the Qin Dynasty (3rd
century BCE) and this fact plays a large role in the legitimacy and acceptance of the HS in the
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PRC today. Dynasties from the Qin on through the ROC period (Republic of China 1912-1949)
all used the system to varying degrees. We will discuss this more when we move on to the
second part and discuss the use of the Hukou in the Autonomous Region of Xinjiang.
When the CCP came to power in 1949 they had a long list of points to complete on their
political agenda, from centralizing the economy to unifying the country under one banner.
Consequently, they used the HS as the perfect means to regulate their economy and
simultaneously monitor their citizens, keeping a special eye on those that might hold contrarian
beliefs to the CCP’s ideology. (Wang 2010).
The Hukou System in Dynastic Times
The HS had its beginnings in the Zhou Dynasty (11th-8th Centuries BCE) and like many
other empires throughout history, the Zhou needed a system of organization in order to properly
tax its denizens. (Su, L. Et. Al. 2018). In the beginning the Chinese needed a system of
organization in order to properly tax its denizens but over the years it developed in order to
continue its original tax purposes while simultaneously acting as a social control mechanism that
operated much like common facets of government at the time. Ranked kinship and feudal classes
served as the cornerstones that would later develop into more ethnic and classist exclusions.
With the cycles of dynasties over centuries, each new dynasty or center of power allowed
the Hukou to go through adjustment and transition periods as well. This resulted in the system
gaining new parameters in terms of purpose and scope from the original taxation and social
control to things such as social and racial stratification and subsequently land redistribution in
the time of the communist revolution. (Wang 2010).
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The enforcement of the HS and its newly described uses ebbed and flowed from dynasty
to dynasty. Much like the immigration policy within the United States, each new administration
had its own set of ideals and priorities and the HS enforcement flowed within this political flux.
There were yearly autumn counts that required each prefecture to report its peoples information
to the imperial court. This is much like the census of today though there were many inaccuracies.
Discretion of enforcement was often left to local officials and gentry and there were often
provincial policies that held sway over the national HS policy. This allowed local leaders to
weigh their own cost of enforcing the Hukou strictly though officially anyone traveling was
required by law to carry a “fu” or identification card. “Illegal migrants” were detained, and
officials that did not do their due diligence were to be criminally charged and prosecuted. (Wang
2010).
The Hukou System in Transition (ROC Period)
During the last dynasties of the 19th century as China transitioned to a more
“westernized” republican system of governance via the ROC government, the HS began to sink
into relative political obscurity. The focus of the ROC government was on the economy but more
specifically industrialization and economic diplomacy. This is very much due to the geopolitical
climate preceding and following the First World War. With colonial powers influencing the ROC
such as Russian and Japan, there was a shift in consciousness that pushed the ROC government
to compete economically and negotiate with outside powers that saw the Chinese as a “sick” or
backwards nation.
The market played a large role in this as lucrative trades began to shift away from
agrarian to urban society. As push-pull mechanisms emerged at the turn of the 20th century
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during the tumultuous ROC period, China saw internal and international migration rise,
diminished political and financial will to enforce the Hukou laws, and subsequently a crippled
governmental capacity to manage any such system.
Though efforts to revitalize the system came and went during these years, it wasn't until
1949 that China would again see such a galvanized Hukou system in place. While the ROC may
not have lasted long they were largely responsible for maintaining the HS through its years on
the political back-burner. This allowed the newly founded PRC with the CCP at the helm to finetune the HS in order to serve its political agenda in an authoritarian communist China.
The Hukou System & the PRC
The PRC utilization of the Hukou took the ancient blueprints and greatly intensified and
enhanced its divisive and discriminatory mechanisms. This bolstering of the Hukou resulted in
the perpetuation of a national exclusion that pulls from Leninist & Stalinist totalitarian Sovietstyle ideology with an adapted Chinese historical precedent. (Wang 2010).
Under PRC control the HS lost its tax function for the most part but under CCP
leadership morphed into what has been named the “baojia system” which is responsible for datacollection in order to maintain social control and enforce uniformity in the Chinese people of the
revolutionary era. Despite this, the HS developed its more known and respected economic use at
postponing what I mentioned earlier as the dreaded Lewis Turn that was plaguing other Asian
nations that were beginning to rapidly industrialize and join the international free market.
Only the PRC after 1949, in a central-planning economy, managed to nationally restore
and greatly enhance the economic function of the HS, while turning it into a full-blown
institutional exclusion. Although the PRC does not have poll or household taxes, hukou-based
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institutional exclusion nonetheless allows the government to extract enormous value
(information) from the excluded majority of the Chinese people. (Wang 2010).
The CCP used the ROC blueprint and implemented many of the laws that would
comprise the CCP’s version of the HS. The CCP began its implementation of the HS well before
their revolution in 1949. According to the work of Fei-Ling Wang, they were using it for mass
mobilization and organization efforts during the guerrilla days of the 1930’s when much of the
revolution was limited to Jiangxi Province and Shanxi Province. The use of the HS in organizing
areas of control in 1939 via the “lian-bao” (connected assurance) system provided the final
foundational layer to the social control and migration control mechanisms that are seen in the
PRC throughout the rest of the 20th century.
One crucial change to the HS that came with the regimentation of the PRC era and the
structure through which the HS was enforced. In villages across the country during the early days
of the Mao era, administrations were set up within every village comprised of party officials
from the larger cities. These officials were appointed directly by the CCP which assured
compliance with party politics. Every five families were put into lian-bao groups which assured
that no one was engaging in activities that would be considered against the interest of the CCP.
This established a system of reporting rule-breakers and set the tone for policy adherence
nationwide.
While I contend that there are two proclaimed uses for the PRC’s version of the Hukou, it
is obvious that the most integral and chief reason for its implementation is its historical use as a
social control tool. This works by breaking people into small enough groups to monitor while
incorporating them into a centralized hierarchy that feeds into the CCP.
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The PRC’s relationship to the Soviet Union in the early days saw some serious carry-over
from Leninist and Stalinist thinkers. Particularly, Stalin and his views on the urban industrial
worker and their relationship with agrarian peasants set the tone for much of the thinking when
comparing the Hukou to the Soviet Propiska (residence permit). This fusion of ideology and
policy ended with a new political rationale and application for the HS within PRC China. (Wang
2010).
At the 91st meeting of the Standing Committee of the First National People’s Congress
on January 9, 1958, the Regulations on Household Registration passed with Mao’s signature and
turned what was an active policy into law nationwide.
“Life chances, resources, political power, and social status were all directly affected and
even determined by one’s Hukou categorization and location. The urban and rural Hukou records
and household Hukou booklets, required for all PRC citizens, were all clearly marked either
“nonagricultural” or “agricultural”; they were even printed in different colors (urban in black ink,
rural in red or green). This intrusive and symbolic use of ink, reflecting the deeply discriminatory
nature of the HS, was not eliminated until nearly twenty years later, in 2000.” (Wang 2010).
Though social control laid at the center of thinking of the HS and its implementation, it
also played a large role in food rationing and resource allocation. This is the main catalyst behind
differential treatment by location, an underpinning of the system that would allow for exclusion
based on geographic location and hukou designation.
By attaching the necessity for survival to the HS in conjunction with the more divisive
purposes the PRC effectively made its citizens both accept and depend upon a system that
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ultimately divided, disenfranchised and ultimately killed millions of ordinary citizens that might
have otherwise rose up against the implementation of such a social control institution.
“The significance of hukou-based institutional exclusion of the rural population became
crystal-clear to everyone after the disastrous Great Leap Forward (1958–61), which made state
food rations a lifesaver in a time of national famine. Twenty to thirty million people, almost all
from the rural areas, are estimated to have perished.” (Wang 2010).
Late 20th Century China & the Lewis Turning Point
The late 20th century was a time of major reformation within the PRC. With the
leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the world saw China open up to the West after decades of
seclusion from the world stage. In an effort to inject some lifeblood into a the rigid planned
economy of Mao’s era, Xiaoping opened China up to the market system that was commonplace
for the rest of the world. This required a fine-tuned balance between a still communist planned
economy and a liberal market system which inevitably led to the boom China saw at the turn of
the 21st century. In order to pull this off the HS had to be reformed too (though not enough to
pull away from the overall CCP agenda set forth by the PRC in 1949).
In this section I will be discussing the main driver behind this reform and the role that it
played in a new national agenda that brought China into an era of unforeseen growth. With
growth came a new set of worries for the CCP leadership even with double digit GDP growth
throughout the last two decades of the 20th century. After taking in a general history of the HS
and its political/functional evolution, it is now important to trace it through its modern
transformation. This period that I will refer to as the “Deng Era” serves as the junction between
the old and the new China. This era focuses mostly on economics and the main agenda that drove
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reform both for the HS and the country at large. This central economic theory that governed CCP
decision-making through these years is called the Lewis Turning Point.
Named after the developmental economist from the West Indies W. Arthur Lewis, the
LTP is a situation that arises in developing countries where surplus rural labor reaches a
“financial zero”. Now sparing the gritty economic details of what can transpire after hitting this
point, it is more important to understand why the CCP leadership is wary of such a point and
what measures the CCP has gone through to avoid hitting this equilibrium of labor surplus and
wages.
The LTP, if hit, has caused labor shortages throughout the country as in the late 19th
century and early 20th century in Japan. This causes agricultural and unskilled industrial wages
to rise which inevitably causes an imbalance between the rural and urban economic sectors. This
normally is not a bad situation to hit for a free market society, but since China worked its way
into a hybrid economy there was one major concern that sat on the heads of CCP leadership. If
there was to be an imbalance in wages, that would then drive agricultural or unskilled laborers
into the urban areas in search of increased gains. In the case of India where this point was hit
roughly in the 1970’s, major cities such as Mumbai and Delhi saw the development of slums in
order to accommodate these new arrivals into the urban economy. The PRC wished to avoid
these developments and keep a balance between the rural and urban economies. In order to do
this they employed the HS as a mechanism to prohibit unfiltered movement into the urban areas.
All in all, the strategy to use the HS as a buffer against hitting this point worked and
pushed the timeline further down the road. It was predicted by the International Monetary Fund
that China would have hit this point somewhere in the early 2000’s but due to the effort this
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likelihood has been pushed down the line to the mid to late 2020’s. (National Bureau of
Statistics).
Recently, theorists have asserted that China is already passing the LTP. Das, M., &
N'Diaye, M. P. M. (2013) claim that China’s reliance on cheap agricultural workers to fill lapses
in the labor market is at an end. Others such as Wang (2010) state that the indication of rising
labor costs is the tell-tale sign that the point has been passed. Other researchers have contested
the aforementioned studies stating that there remains a large reserve of rural labor to be utilized
in order to fill the economic slowdown. Their main objection is that institutional barriers such as
the HS have crippled the ability of the government to utilize these reserves in light of a slowed
economy since the mid-2000’s. (Meng 2011).
So like most policies there are researchers that have sided on one side of the issue or the
other. The reason I discuss these dissenting views on the LTP and whether it has been passed or
not is to highlight why there are calls to reform the HS and why the CCP leadership has been
unwilling to do so. Whether or not the point has been passed is not of concern to me due to the
fact that this is not a piece on economics. It highlights a question that I have with regard to the
CCP leadership and the true uses of the HS. I am going to highlight these reasons in the next
section where I will discuss the more nefarious use of the HS as a social control mechanism and
why this is important to the CCP.
There are other older and more cultural reasons as to why the CCP is reluctant to change
the system which I will mention in the conclusion once I have explored more thoroughly the
cases on abuse in the borderland Autonomous Region of Xinjiang. Though it is apparent that the
HS is in need of reform to fit the modern era that is not the central focus of my study. What I am
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wanting to hit on is the exclusion that came as a result of such policy implementation. It is
apparent that controlling mobility in any form or facet is dangerous to individual freedoms, but
that is not a topic generally discussed in the era that this policy was implemented. National unity
and the development of a national psychology/agenda or consciousness is what was really
important to the CCP during its 20th century transitions. This is evident in the use of
Confucianism, Daoism and other ancient philosophies to tie together the Chinese people. This
has become equally apparent in the CCP’s recent attempts to Sinosize Islam in order to
incorporate the Muslim-Chinese populations that comprise much of the Autonomous Regions
that I will mention in the second part of this article.
Building a Nation: Mythos vs. Reality
The state-coordinated control over the life and death of its denizens is nothing
particularly new. Throughout history control has been present in the carrying out of legal justice
through imprisonment, exile, and execution. Foucault spent much of his life working on these
issues and draws focus to a change in approach during the 19th and 20th centuries where nations
began to shift from necro-politics (controlling death) to bio-politics (controlling life) through the
healthcare and justice systems. (Foucault, M. 2016).
In the Chinese context bio-politics is at play most starkly in the “One Child Policy” that
was enacted during the mid to late 20th century. But these are both positive and negative, there
have been increased global health initiatives and public health measures and a broader effort to
maintain symbiosis between man and environment. On the other hand there has been genocide,
violence, and general conflict surrounding national determination and socialist collectivization.
(Greenhalgh, S. & Winckler, E, A. 2005).
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Now comes the central question that many have asked me about my research: Why study
China and CCP government within this context? Simply, the management of a population of this
size (now past 1.3 billion) and the ever expanding efforts that the CCP has made to control such
a massive and diverse population merits study. Especially when we take into account just how
poorly western researchers have addressed the basic drivers of these interventions in the past.
While most westerners have heard of the CCP’s intervention into birth and population
control, very little time has been spent studying institutions such as the HS and why it operates as
such a vital instrument of sociopolitical intervention. “Since the founding of the PRC in 1949,
population has become a central object of power in China. Concern about governing population
processes originated in the PRC regime but soon spread throughout Chinese
society.” (Greenhalgh, S. & Winckler, E, A. 2005).
Though this focus has stayed mostly on the location of populations and growth, more
recently the PRC has been focused on creating national identity and suturing any rifts that appear
due to ethnic or socioeconomic divide. This focus of concern was initially on the location of the
population. This refers to keeping rural citizens rural and out of the urban areas. Despite this,
focus slowly shifted to embrace its “quantity” by slowing growth and limiting size.
Simultaneously it shifted focus to its population “quality” by enhancing not only health and
education but also social morality and political commitment.” (Greenhalgh, S. & Winckler, E, A.
2005).
This in the 21st century remains an overwhelming and ever-expanding area of interest for
the CCP and its leadership. Since Chairman Mao’s death there have been a number of
demographic discourses that have manifested into institutions and policies that are now
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embedded throughout the government. This is apparent in the transformation of the HS and its
use as a social and economic control mechanism.
There remains a major gap in western study of the HS which revolves around the political
realities and agendas that have brought it to life. There is an interest in the role of population
control as a long-term strategy for the growth and strengthening of the PRC as a nation. While
my research wont be filling in all of these voids surrounding the political effects of such
intervention in population control, it will contribute to the field by priming questions that future
research will be more likely to complete, This research includes understanding the long-term
effects of the CCP’s Hukou initiatives on each population of interest: Han mainlanders, those
ethnic minorities that comprise the AR’s and surrounding nations in the geopolitical arena. All of
this circles back to my primary focus on China and its place on the world stage and what it is
willing to do to boost its current status, legitimacy, and control.
To get at these primer questions, I have employed the use of Michel Foucault’s
methodology of identifying important realties of the present and working our way backwards
through history in order to understand their development and origin. This results in what
Foucault called a “history of the present”. But before we really mine into the case studies that
will comprise the second section of this research, we have to understand the ideological origins
of this brand of control and intervention in the PRC. According to the work of Greenhalgh and
Winckler, the CCP’s and subsequently the PRC’s approach has always been “Leninist in the
broad sense of relying on strong leadership by an organized party which claims that its
“scientific” ideology “democratically” represents the most progressive forces in society and
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shows in what direction the country should go. However, the CCP has experimented with a
spectrum of variants within Leninism, ranging from left through center to right”.
On one end of the spectrum we see the largely organic approach to governance often
categorized as “Maoism” and on the other end we see revolutionary Leninism that was critical to
the style of ascension for the CCP. This style hinged on ideological agreement and minimal to no
bureaucracy. (Greenhalgh, S. & Winckler, E, A. 2005).
This style then shifts after the revolution in 1949 and takes on the more sinister and
“newly” effective Stalinist system of governance. This understanding allows us to get a better
feel for the ideological foundations and progress from the HS of 1949 to its modern application
in Xi Jinping’s PRC of today. Institutionalized population discourse which relies on the framings,
narratives, and representations produced by, and central to, the regime’s population program is
the foundation that set policy agendas and propaganda throughout the history of the PRC. These
framings reflect a changing mix of party-state, scientific, and ‘Chinese cultural’ logics.
(Greenhalgh, S. & Winckler, E, A. 2005).
Despite the length and history of China, after the 1949 revolution there was a need for the
PRC led by the CCP to construct a new Chinese national identity. The identity has two
foundational pillars that are important to understand in conjunction with the function of the
Hukou System in mainland China but especially its function in the Autonomous Regions. The
first pillar focuses on the development of a creation mythos backed by history and shared
cultural heritage. The second focuses on legitimizing CCP rule and building a pathway to the
future. This is evident when looking at the PRC in the 20th century and increasingly in the 21st
as China has gone from a primarily fractured and “sick” nation driven by agrarian economics to a
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world leading economy that is a result of rapid industrialization and recently an opening to world
markets.
With these two foundations in mind, the CCP made great efforts to legitimize their rule
and mythos from an ideological perspective by borrowing heavily from Marxist and Leninist
ideology in conjunction with past Confucian identity. Though this might seem to be the end of
the road on that front there is a secondary influence that comes in the form of geographic
regimentation that comes through institutions. These result in land claims stemming from
historical ties. We see this most aggressively used in the annexation of Tibet as well as the efforts
to absorb Xinjiang (Eastern Turkestan) with consequently increased efforts to “sinocize” islam in
order to legitimize and control non-Han populations in Xinjiang by making them historically
recognized vassals of the empire.
We will explore this theme more closely in the next section that focuses on the
Autonomous Region of Xinjiang that has served as a testing ground for CCP political practice as
well as the legitimization of the PRC and subsequently the CCP’s leadership of the PRC. This is
where the HS becomes of increasing importance. While we have already discussed the economic
aspects of the HS, it is the social-control aspects that carry out its “true” or most propagandized
purpose.
Part II: Case Studies from Xinjiang
The Socio-Political Control of Xinjiang (Eastern Turkestan)
In this next section I evaluate two case studies in order to highlight the latent duality of
the HS. The first of these case studies focuses on the Uyghur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang
and the way the HS has systematically divided the population and controlled movement in order
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to pacify and manipulate the Uyghur peoples’ ability to organize politically, socially, and
economically. With a population of nearly 1.4 billion, the PRC is a multi-ethnic nation comprised
of 56 official ethnic groups stretching from the Han heartland centered in cities like Beijing,
Shanghai and Chengdu to the western periphery regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang. The Uyghur
people of Xinjiang have a rough population of 10 million and make up one of the largest ethnic
minorities within the PRC. (National Bureau of Statistics 2010).
As a predominantly muslim population of Turkic origin, the Uyghur have recently made
international headlines due to maltreatment by the PRC government and CCP policy in the
region of Xinjiang. Much of this focus has been on the status of this ethnic group and their
disadvantaged status that has been likened to the plight that Tibetans have faced under the heel of
the PRC since it's annexation in 1950. There has been much analysis directed at Uyghur political
and social repression under the CCP but keep in mind that this disadvantaged status has been a
reality for the Uyghur people since before the revolution in 1949. According to the work of
Ildiko Beller-Hann, Xinjiang and its Uyghur population has always played a role in Chinese
political decision-making since dynastic times.
This relationship persists into the present for a multitude of reasons but one predominant
driver of Han interest in the region has to do with its key strategic geographic position. Xinjiang
borders strategic points both within the PRC (resource regions with oil) while simultaneously
playing a role in regional geopolitics. It borders Tibet, Russia, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and India. Not to mention it borders other Turkic countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan. In terms of size it covers nearly one sixth of the PRC’s total landmass and acts as a
buffer between other eastern powers and the Han heartland. This was especially important during
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the colonial and Soviet era when Russia extended through many of these border countries. Not to
mention it acts as the single largest administrative unit under PRC control. (Beller-Hann 2008).
Xinjiang & Shifting Empires
As I have already mentioned, Xinjiang has had a tumultuous history but in order to
understand it in a broader historical context there is a line to follow geographically and
politically through the centuries. Xinjiang within itself contains two geographically, historically
and ethnically distinct regions: Dzungaria which is the region north of the Tianshan Mountains
and the more densely populated region called the Tarim Basin on the southern side of the
mountains. Xinjiang was not called Xinjiang until the late 19th Century after it came under the
protection of the Qing Dynasty following the Dungan Revolt (1862-1877). (Chiao-Min, H., &
Falkenheim, V. C. 2018).
The Tarim Basin was first referred to as Xiyu by the Chinese under the Han Dynasty in
60 BCE with the emergence of the Silk Road. The Han maintained a military presence in the
region until the beginning of the 3rd century. For a time after the region was controlled by local
ruler until the 6th century when the Turkic Khanagate was established. For the next two hundred
years there were wars waged between the Tang Dynasty, Turks and Tibetans until the Tang
finally came out on top establishing the Anxi Protectorate of Xinjiang and Central Asia. (ChiaoMin, H., & Falkenheim, V. C. 2018).
After the fall of the Tang Dynasty history shows the rise of the Uyghur Khaganate, the
first real consolidated leadership by the ethnic majority in the region throughout the 8th and 9th
centuries. As Uyghur power declined three main powers rose to fill the vacuum. The Buddhist
Uyghur Kara-Khoja, the Turkic Muslim Kara-Khanid and the Iranian Buddhist Khotan. The
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Turkic Muslims prevailed and Islamized the region giving it much of its ethnographic pallor that
carries on today. In the 13th century the Mongol Empire swept in, briefly taking power before
the Turkic people once again resumed leadership of the region. This all changed in the 18th
century when the Qing Dynasty conquered the area. (Chiao-Min, H., & Falkenheim, V. C. 2018).
The reason I have tapped into this little history/geography exposition is to stress an
importance on the impermanence of governance in the region. This will become important in the
final section when I discuss separatist movements and protests in Xinjiang today. Understanding
the origins and the general composition of the political landscape before firm Chinese rule does
give us some necessary context as to why these movements exist (and their validity) but also
why the PRC is so aggressive in its current policies regarding the absorption of Xinjiang into
China permanently.
Governance Tactics & Strategy in Xinjiang (ROC Period)
To say the least, the relationship has been one that has stretched across the centuries but it
really was not until the ROC period that we see the rise of strict ethnopopulism, an era of policy
that saw the Uyghur in the same way the British saw their subjects in India. This relationship and
dynamic set down during the period was tenuous and illustrates that the mission of legitimacy
and cohesion was and still is of paramount importance to the central government during both the
ROC and PRC eras. I would not go so far as to call the relationship paternalistic, nor would I
label it strict manifest destiny but there are familiar rhetorics within this relationship. The ROC
government was very straightforward in its view of the Uyghur as a backwards and different
peoples that needed Han governance as illustrated in the following excerpts from cables between
Han officials in the region.
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ROC officials were always careful of the powder-keg that was their relationship with
Xinjiang during their tumultuous years in power. In a series of cables between Han officials from
this era we get a thorough look at the mood and concerns rippling from Nanjing to Urumqi, the
capital of Xinjiang. “…Xinjiang is a muslim territory. If we suppress popular uprisings with
force, it will be sure to create hatred and enmity with the Han…” (Jacobs 2010 page 106).
The ROC government pursued a multitude of strategies in the region in order to bring
Xinjiang into the fold but only ethnopopulism and policies that emanated from such an ideology
were found to be moderately successful in terms of the ROC agenda. The nationalists decided
that the time had come in 1933 to make their presence in the region felt. In order to do this they
sent a “pacification commissioner” to the region in order to exert dominance and establish
political strength in the region as it was beginning to ebb in the other periphery states.
Despite this aggressive tactic the ROC officials that made the call stressed their need to
send someone who is unbiased toward the muslim populace. But like anyone would guess this
worry was more about self preservation than actual desire for equality and benevolent leadership
in the region as shown in the following excerpt: “…send a prestigious, high-ranking official who
holds no prejudice against the muslims. But above all else, you cannot allow any muslim figure
to obtain a position of real authority in Xinjiang.” (Jacobs 2010 page 107). Subsequently this
method of governance in the region was adopted by the PRC and the legacy of this method is
still prevalent in headlines coming from Xinjiang today.
The Xinjiang-PRC Relationship
There are a number of economic and social precedents that set the stage in the late 19th
century that led to the current socioeconomic stratification and composition of modern-day
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Xinjiang. Inequalities that have their roots in many pre-industrial societies are still preserved
today. With the rise of the ROC at the end of the Qing Dynasty, which would give way to the
PRC and CCP rule after 1949, the colonial legacy introduced to the region through many social,
economic and political frameworks has engendered ethnic divides that persist today. Conflict
lays at the heart of this issue and is not limited to just ruling and subordinate classes. Tensions
overflowed into ethnic, religious and linguistic divisions that have been a major part of the fabric
of Xinjiang since the beginning. (Beller-Hann 2008).
In the modern context this conflict largely played out through policies bent on social
control for a variety of reasons. Understanding these social control mechanisms will give further
insight into the mind of PRC officials and what both sides generally desire as political outcomes.
By illustrating this, why the tenuous relationship has persisted and why it will continue to linger
unless there is major policy reform will be addressed. In particular I relate my findings to the
presence of the HS and the broader social aims the PRC hopes to achieve via this particular
institution.
In order to first acquaint ourselves within the drivers of these divides we must dive into
the legacy of socialism in Xinjiang and what has been referred to by Beller-Hann as the
“civilizing project” initiated in the region after the 1949 revolution. In the early years of PRC
rule, the CCP labeled the Uyghur as an ethnic minority and incorporated the region into the
classification of an autonomous region. This gave legal precedent to their territorial foundations
and lent a collective identity that was not so cut and dry. With the massive project of unifying the
Chinese state and building State-Owned Enterprises (SOE’s) we see how measures that were
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implemented nation-wide had deleterious effects upon Uyghur communities, rendering Uyghur
groups, whether they come in the form of families or markets, generally insecure.
While it is important to discuss the macro policy machinations of the PRC in conjunction
with the effect this has had on the Uyghur people, we must also understand the role of the Han
migrant in Xinjiang and the role they play as colonial or imperial extensions of the CCP
government. Migrants in this regions are broken down into different categories, each with
distinct ambitions and missions.
There are the economic migrants that come in the form of “Bingtuaners”, and profitdriven migrants, there are the official personnel sent by the CCP government, as well as students
and young professionals. Each has a distinct role to fill within the region while simultaneously
fitting into a more macro discussion as well. It has been theorized by many that these migrants
(majority of which are Han Chinese) are extensions of the government with the purpose of
colonizing the region in the hopes of bringing the region deeper into the fold of PRC control. All
efforts by the PRC to incorporate Xinjiang relate back to the mission of nation-building by using
historical precedent, and economic propaganda in order to further legitimize PRC rule.
In terms of flow, these migrants often move in a circular pattern akin to much global
migration, but the extent to which history plays a role is really where my focus is on this
particular section. The longevity of state-sponsored migration programs for Han Chinese leaves a
mark and subsequently this mark comes in the form of a sustained Han presence in the region.
While they do not comprise the majority of the region, their role and dispersal throughout the
social strata of the region suggests that the power within the region is dispersed amongst these
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Han migrants, leaving Uyghur people on the periphery. This is where exclusion and social
control become vital tools of governance in the region.
The first large-scale migration of Han into the region came in 1954 during the
reconstruction period in China. It is estimated that there were more than 100,000 soldiers from
various regiments that were moved into the region during this time. Most of these soldiers took
up plots of land and participated in a multitude of farm jobs. While this played well into the
designs of the central government in Beijing, it was difficult to maintain this sort of momentum.
The uneven distribution of the sexes led to a sort of circular pattern being maintained. Soldiers
and professionals would come to the region for a few years before returning home to find wives
and start families.
This is the main reason that the PRC has had to use an amalgamation of tactics
(incentives) to keep the region dominated politically and economically by ethnic Han. “Though
none of them expected to stay in Xinjiang for a lifetime, cases of resistance were rare. This was
likely due to the desolate situation of the Chinese countryside in general, and also to government
propaganda that celebrated the settlers as “masters” (zhuren) of Xinjiang.” (Jacobs 2010).
This recruitment and settlement effort during the first decades of PRC rule eventually
created an influx of Han migrants to the point where by 1966 the number of Bingtuan settlers
reached an estimated 1.48 million. (Jacobs 2010). This has continued into the 21st century where
the number has nearly doubled. While there is some outflow that has become a trend in recent
years the number has remained mostly fixed by incorporating students into the mission of
settlement via work-study programs.
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“Educated Youth (Zhishi qingnian, briefly Zhiqing), or Shanghai Educated Youth
(Shanghai zhiqing) as they are sometimes referred to, is a broad category that nominally includes
all high school and university graduates who arrived in Xinjiang in the early decades of
Communist rule. However, in popular Han discourse, the signifier “Educated Youth” is typically
used to denote one particular group of educated youth, namely the rusticated urban youth of the
Cultural Revolution (1966–76).” (Jacobs 2010).
In conjunction with this, we saw in the Deng era a relaxation of the registration system
that would eventually lead to more flexible migration flows that was more geared toward the
modern Chinese youth. The generally elastic nature of Han migration in recent years has kept
Uyghur and Han populations sequestered in their political and social spheres with little overlap
in the economic realm.
All of this is part and parcel to the colonial effort that is still being carried out today.
When evaluating institutions that are strung together throughout different dynasties, there has to
be some common denominator that has allowed it to persist through regime change. In the case
of the Hukou System, imperial motivation is that common denominator.
For the last 200 years each regime has been an empire, in function, whether or not it has
been officially labeled as such. China has been a multi-ethnic/national nation governed by the
Han majority. The significance of this is the stark contrast, linguistically, religiously and
politically that the Han people have from those peoples in the borderlands that fall under their
governance.
Approaching this apparent disparity has been a major political problem dating back well
before the formation of the PRC. Each comes with its own challenges, and as such there are few
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institutions that permeate each region. The HS is one of these systems. Jacobs refers to this
governance as “strategic manipulation” which hinges upon the use of cultural elitism, physical
inclusion and exclusion, as well as widespread propaganda. (Agnieszka 2013).
Human Rights Violations in Xinjiang
The situation in Xinjiang is one that is difficult to discuss within the human rights arena.
This is not because there are not human rights violations in the region, or that these violations are
minor in some form or fashion so as to not warrant concern, but rather because we are not
discussing a liberal western democracy but rather an authoritarian regime backed by 2,500 years
of history.
This is not to say that human rights violations do not occur in western liberal democracies
but rather that the role of politics and political pressure when working to cease the perpetuation
of violations is much more difficult. Within the global context, human rights and the enforcement
of human rights hinges upon pressure from other nations, often members, or signees of some
treaty, agreement, or protocol. While China has signed a number of these types of agreements
what I would like to take a moment to focus on is enforcement. The idealism that is behind
human rights in the geopolitical arena is one that is both inspiring and toothless in many ways.
This is all due to the fact that national autonomy and the protections that come with it
from international law greatly overpower the political will it takes to push nations to intervene in
one another’s internal affairs. In the past this has started wars, ended wars and ultimately set the
stage for the world as we know it today. Despite this, most of the time power is exerted in much
softer ways but that soft power is reliant upon a natural imbalance of power between the nation
holding account and the nation being held to account.
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China is more or less impervious to this soft-power dynamic especially in the era of Xi
Jinping who has been a strongman for China for the last seven years with not much of an end in
sight. Why is this? Well, not only is China one of the great military superpowers on earth, with
the largest standing army and a rapidly expanding navy and air-force, but it is also responsible
for economic development projects all over the world — from Africa and Southeast Asia, to
places like Europe. With this combined military and economic power, the political will to force
China into a position where they would need to cease all human rights violations in Xinjiang is
little though there is major media outcry the world over. Despite this, it is mostly used for
politics that falls short of the adequate amount of pressure to pursue comprehensive change in
Xinjiang.
The main metric for looking at human rights globally is the document that started it all
back in 1948. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a product of post-WWII
negotiations that hoped to guide the world into a new era of peace and prosperity after millions
died and most of Europe lay in ruin. The UDHR and its 30 articles laid the foundation for what
would become the International Bill of Human Rights which got its stripes in 1976. Needless to
say, these documents have shaped much of the international world in both politics and economics
over the course of the late 20th and early 21st century.
For the rest of this section I am going to give a bit of context as to what is going on in
Xinjiang today. Reports have been coming out of the region for the better part of a decade
regarding human rights violations but it was only very recently that headlines started reaching
western papers about the troubles in Xinjiang.
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Articles 1-3, 5-7, 9-15, 17-20, and 26-30 are all under threat or outright violated by the
PRC’s actions. The CCP is systematically bioengineering everyday life in Xinjiang. The biopolitics in the region take the shape of the holocaust but without the mass murder. Rather, there is
the campaign to erase the religion and ethnic practices of the Uyghur people. Uyghurs, as I have
stated above can not travel freely, worship their faith, speak to their relatives, name their children
or gather socially. These efforts are being exercised through surveillance and community
segregation. By segregating groups of Uyghurs from ethnic Han by neighborhood, then further
isolating them through detention, they are able to effectively disassemble identity and the very
way of life of every Uyghur man, woman, and child. (Richardson, S. 2019).
In a report put out by Human Rights Watch, nearly 1 million Uyghurs are detained in
what the CCP is calling “re-education camps”. This report went on to say, “…the human
engineering experiment the Chinese government is undertaking resembles the policies of the
most repressive colonial regimes and is as Orwellian as China’s Cultural Revolution…” and that
Beijing is using all of its political and economic leverage to deter other nations from stepping in.
(Fuchs, M. H., et al, 2018).
There is one important component of this surveillance practice that has potential global
repercussions. The tactics used in places like Tibet and Xinjiang are not complete. They are
functioning as testing sites for a new brand of authoritarian governance. By using what HRW has
labeled “high-tech totalitarianism” the methods of surveillance become available for export and
this is already being felt in countries from Asia to Africa and even South America. (Human
Rights Watch 2020).
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I mentioned before that the efforts in Xinjiang are not new, but rather the way that the
PRC is exercising its power is new. I discussed in previous sections how the colonial lessons of
the 19th and 20th centuries greatly influenced the beginnings of the PRC and its relationship
with Xinjiang. In this next bit I want to focus on exactly how the PRC’s tactics in the 21st
century are being executed and ultimately felt by the Uyghur population.
In order to do this we have traced our way back to the year 2001 and the Global War on
Terror initiated by then US president George W. Bush. This effectively set the precedent for a
world power such as the US or China to use the threat of “terrorism” and “islamic extremism” as
a carte blanche to circumvent safeguards that would normally prevent such egregious violations.
There are many similarities between what we see in Xinjiang and what the US has done overseas
and on its borders in recent years. Using fear to manipulate the masses into allowing
overextension of governmental and military powers.
In the case of Xinjiang, the PRC has created the most advanced surveillance system in the
world. They use this system to target the muslim-majority minority Uyghur people. As part of an
anti-terrorism campaign, the PRC has made mandatory facial-recognition scans a common
feature of day to day life. According to a report from Foreign Policy they have “Wi-Fi Sniffers”
that collect data from devices hooked up to the networks. All of this has been in an effort to
locate, round up, and detain Uyghurs in black-sites called “re-education centers”. (Rollet C.
2018).
This detention is largely arbitrary, and leads to forced political, religious and social
indoctrination. The PRC’s “Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism” is the main organ
to pushes out this propaganda. The main body apart from the Hukou System that has allowed
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violations to persist is the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP). (Ramzy, A., & Buckley,
C. 2019).
The first reports trickled out into bigger media circles from HRW back in February of
2018. A major effort of understanding the system came through the reverse engineering of the
app used by the IJOP. There were patterns that arose from further study and it was determined
that the app performs three functions. One is the collection of personal data, two reporting on the
activities of potential dissidents, and three initiating investigations and probes into persons of
interest.
While it may be difficult to understand just how easy it is to end up on this list for us the
HRW reporters that Uyghurs can become people of interest through the simplest of actions.
“Xinjiang authorities consider many forms of lawful, everyday, non-violent behavior—such as
‘not socializing with neighbors, often avoiding using the front door’—as suspicious. The app
also labels the use of 51 network tools as suspicious, including many Virtual Private Networks
(VPNs) and encrypted communication tools, such as WhatsApp and Viber.” (Human Rights
Watch 2020).
There are reports that have come out in recent months of parents and children being
separated for upward of three or four years. Children as young as three and four are separated
from their parents and even upon release, the parents are not given contact information or access
to their children. (Human Rights Watch 2019). Here is an excerpt from the HRW report
highlighting these separations:
Abdurahman Tohti, a Uyghur living in Turkey, has been unable to contact his son, now 4,
and daughter, 3, since authorities detained his wife in August 2016. In January, he
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spotted his son in a video posted online that showed him in a school answering questions
in Chinese. “I miss my children, my wife,” said Tohti. “I want them back very much. I
fear if I ever meet my children again in my lifetime, they wouldn’t know who I am, and
they would’ve been assimilated as Chinese and think that I’m their enemy.”

It is apparent that there are discrepancies between the proposed reason behind the
detentions that the PRC gives and the real motives that have spurred policy change in the past
few years. While 2001 was a definite turning point in terms of strategy the real change came
closer to the end of the decade. In 2009 there were surges of anti-government protests that
occurred throughout Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang. These were coupled with separatist protests
in 2014 that led to 39 deaths when a market was attacked. This final disturbance in the status quo
forced Xi Jinping to set a new policy course in the region which resulted in the camps discussed
above. (Foreign Policy 2018).
In an effort to “sinocize” Uyghurs they have been detained. Because of terrorism
surveillance and segregation are necessary. These are the logics of the PRC rhetoric but at the
heart of the matter is a separatist movement and the threat of Xinjiang becoming its own nation
which would have major repercussions for the military and economic strategy of China and its
neighbors.
Part III: Han Rural-Urban Migration
Introduction (An Overview of Current Affairs)
As I mentioned in the first section of this article, migrants are naturally drawn from the
countryside to the cities in search of economic gain. The CCP employed the HS in order to
mitigate the effects of a quickly approaching LTP which the CCP so desperately has tried to
avoid. By limiting migrants’ mobility there have been effects both short term and long term that
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have precipitated this control. In this section I will bring up a couple case studies that fall into
each category in an attempt to illustrate HS effects on ethnic Han populations that comprise the
heartland. This will serve in my effort to compare and contrasts the effects on my case
populations.
As we shift our focus geographically to another section of the Chinese population it is
important to also shift our focus temporally. While the previous sections have focused on the
historical factors that have led us to the current situation in the borderlands, when we shift to
focus on rural to urban migrants within the PRC we should also begin to incorporate the idea of
China’s rapid industrialization and its opening to global markets, which happened in a much
tighter time frame.
Throughout the 20th century we saw rapid industrialization globally. In China, when the
CCP took control after the revolution, we saw a sort of stagnation, with heavy reliance on and
control of the agricultural sectors of the economy. As time progressed further into the 20th
century toward the turn of the 21st, the Hukou System became integral to the socio-economic
distribution of benefits and the relationship these benefits have to citizens’ geographic location.
Although internal migration in response to this rapid urbanization has been occurring
since the CCP’s birth it has picked up drastically over the last 30 years or so. In response to this,
the central government has gone to great lengths to control who can call the urban centers home.
This has had some pretty astounding effects upon rural migrants that are faced with giving up
their rural status and become what has been termed “floating migrants”.
These migrants have no right to benefits and often become social pariah within society;
while being exploited by businesses and resented by officials and citizens in every province. This
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migration phenomena has forced the government to become increasingly reliant upon the idea of
“de jure urbanization” in order to secure continued growth without over-saturation of the urban
centers. The reason for this is due to the nature of migrant flows and how, like many flows
globally, have taken on a circular pattern which makes it very difficult for the government to
properly track de facto urbanization.
There are rural and urban Hukou placements as I have stated above and these determine
the benefits and opportunities migrants can receive. More importantly, this categorization forces
citizens to be dependent in many ways to their Hukou status. Urban holders are tied to their
places of work and rural holders are tied to their land. Though, currently, the system is at its most
relaxed, in the past this control has made the rural-urban migration patterns barely a blip on the
radar of the CCP government. But now, with a loosening of the rules, the countrysides are
emptying in favor of urban areas due to perceived economic benefits. While the system is still in
place, those that choose to leave their land are at risk of losing both their land and any hope of
attaining an urban designation.
In a study by Meng (2010), there is some consensus within the Chinese government to
increase the benefits of rural migrants to urban areas but Meng states that “granting urban social
benefits to rural migrants and reforming rural land use rights by themselves might not be
sufficient to attract a large proportion of rural individuals to settle permanently in urban
areas.” (Meng 2010).
While this migration trend has fluctuated over the years, migration has not slowed.
Traditionally, when times are hard in the city migrants will return home to their rural villages so
as to reap the benefits of farming. Despite this trend though, it is obvious that the allure of the
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cities is not lost on young rural Hukou holders. Since the turn of the 21st century, urbanization
levels in China have profoundly changed in urban areas. Levels of in-migration to the urban
areas is projected to rise continually into the mid 21st century. The level of urbanization is
expected to reach 75% by the 2050s (Cheng and Masser, 2003). Currently, the number of large
cities (with a population of over 1 million) has increased from 13 to 56 (Wu, Zhang and Shen
2011). This is all driven by the new emphasis on private enterprise within the Chinese economy
and the role of competition, and foreign investment coming in over the last 10 years or so.
Parallel to sentiments here in the United States, rural migrants that have come to work in
the urban areas are seen as a problem by not only the government but the urban residents
themselves. (Wing Chan 2010).
Despite this sentiment, it is obvious the impact that these migrants have made on the
economy. They have contributed greatly to the grand agenda of industrialization that China has
been seeking since the 1980’s. It is important though to recognize that these migrants are
particularly vulnerable when the economy turns and support for these migrants takes a dive.
Since 2012 there have been official attempts to reform the system to benefit and protect these
migrants though there is not much hope of progress being fully realized due to the duplicitous
nature of the HS and its role in the borderlands.
Rural holders have been encouraged in recent years to start applying for smaller urban
Hukou centers, not as large as Beijing or Shanghai but areas that would be a step up from their
rural origins. Migrants remain reluctant to this idea due to the fact that they would be forced to
give up their landholdings. Being able to have the best of both worlds is what drives many
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migrants to become floating migrants factoring greatly into the cost-risk evaluations and so this
initiative has largely failed. (Mohabir 2017).
Nearly 13 million Chinese citizens lack official HS registration. Naturally, this presents a
set of hurdles for their ability to claim a number of benefits including welfare, obtaining identity
documents, employment or even citizenship in a broader sense. One can trace back this massive
population of unregistered people to the days of the one-child policy. While this may be an
integral piece to the puzzle one must also understand the role of internal migration and the HS
due to fact that citizenship rights are locally determined.
The HS is locally managed and this means that the ability for citizens to register their
kids is extremely difficult. In a study put out by Vrotherms (2019) it was established that children
born in violation of the one-child policy had lower rates of registration and that children born to
migrants mothers were four times more likely to be unregistered. All of this can be traced back to
the one-child policy, but the role of the HS and its structures that act as barriers plays a much
more integral role in the continued struggle floating migrants face even after the end of the
policy.
Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Floating Migrant
When discussing what factors come into the decision to migrate, an image of scales
always comes to mind. Decision-making is a natural dialectic that relies on the weighing of
positives and negatives of the move. Naturally, in most cases of migration there are linguistic,
legal and economic incentives and disincentives that drive decision-making. In this particular
instance it is a little different due to the internal nature of this migration. In the following
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sections I will be discussing these pros and cons and the shape that migrant migration takes
within the Chinese heartland. (Li, L. & Liu, Y. 2019)
In 2014 the Chinese Labor-force Dynamics Survey (CLDS) was conducted in order to
measure migrants’ settlement intentions and the different factors that came into play in forming
these intentions. A big part of the puzzle was determining whether or not an official Hukou
transfer was a positive or negative part of the decision-making. In total, the survey covered a
multitude of factors such as: individual demographic characteristics, urban working and living
conditions, rural resources and attachment and even geographic characteristics. In an interesting
turn of events, the study found that rural migrants’ transfer intentions were much weaker than
originally surmised. The rural migrants preferred small and medium cities for urban settlement
but larger and megacities for urban hukou conversion. Obviously, the latter is more difficult to
attain therefore desire is low in terms of risk-taking by rural migrants. (State Council 2014).
The HS does not only restrict migration in a broad sense but also prohibits natural
integration of internal migrants by systematically excluding those people that are not locally
registered. This affects migrants’ access to all of a locality’s pubic services from healthcare to
pension and subsidized housing but most importantly education. This institutionalized exclusion
has left an entire subsection of the population as second-class citizens. (Solinger 1999).
It was further determined that a set of complex determinants surrounding settlement
intention was at play. Factors such as age, education, marital status and spouse living situations,
as well as working conditions played the greatest role in making a decision on resettlement.
Transfer on the other hand had much more to do with age, income and the rural landholdings the
prospective migrant had. In short, it is apparent that the will to go through legal avenues of
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transfer or full-relocation are not particularly desired by migrants but rather the maintenance of
benefits from both categories though it is fundamentally riskier to maintain. This plays a large
role in the circular pattern of floating migrants and as we will explore in the next sections plays a
fundamental role in the next generation in both positive and negative ways.
A Generational Push & Pull
Much of the discussion of integration is rooted in rural hukou-holders’ land rights. Those
with rural hukou designations but weaker ties to land ownership tend to form their decisionmaking dialectic much differently than those with strong land ties or ownership. While they both
struggle to integrate on a political or economic level the likelihood of integrating socially goes
up with ones ability to not worry about losing their rural benefits (aka land holdings). This lack
of worry allows migrants to merge their lives more effectively to the urban work environment
and therefore gives them an edge in an economy that is likely to become more reliant on skilled
labor that must be attained over time.
One important thing to keep in mind when discussing floating migrants is the role that the
economy plays in the pattern of migration. Circular migration is common and so in times of
economic hardship many migrants return to their rural villages to reap the benefits of agricultural
work. This has engendered animosity between floating migrants and properly documented
migrants that do not have the luxury of playing both sides. During times of stricter control via the
HS, floating migrants tend to be subject to negative stereotypes and prejudice. (Chen & Hamori
2009).
In recent years the CCP leadership has labeled these migrants as an “urban disease” much
like they worried about hitting the LTP. This line of rhetoric has drastically affected how
migrants are seen by business owners and local residents. This further plays into the decision-

49 of 63
making dynamic these migrants face and has led to a pressure to follow “legal” avenues of
migration. Why a migrant would choose to go or stay has a lot to do with level of income. (Yue,
Li, Feldman, & Du, 2010).
Economic incentives are important when making any family or individual decisions that
incorporates risk. The generally unstable nature of being a floating migrant means that they move
around for a multitude of reasons associated with their individual level of risk. What is not
generally discussed is the generational aspect of this risk.
What kind of opportunity does a child have when their parent leaves, or if they risk losing
their right to benefits? This is where the risk drastically increases for families. This is where we
see the greatest divergence in push-pull factors in decision-making and it will be the topic of the
next section on floating migrants.
Education Opportunity for a New Generation
As we have already discussed, the HS is unpopular due to its restriction of free movement
of labor and by proxy, limiting access to benefits for this migrant population. Floating migrants
don't have access to benefits themselves but this also applies to their children. This has become a
pressing concern for many researchers and is a central issue when we begin to examine the
outcomes of benefit restriction to migrant families but especially the children of these families.
The cognitive and non-cognitive developmental issues that come along with this are significant.
(Guo Yu, Zhao Liqiu 2019).
Cognitive developmental outcomes are significant predictors of a child’s overall
development. There have been a number of studies conducted in recent years that have examined
the possible outcomes of a number of factors on a child’s development. Familial life and
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education are two major facets of a child’s life that affect their development. On the other hand
there has been focus on the term “non-cognitive outcomes” which incorporate personal traits
such as optimism, resilience, adaptability, motivations, and conscientious- ness, that have been
shown to be associated with individuals' success. (Guo Yu, Zhao Liqiu 2019).
This focus on cognitive and non-cognitive development really is an extension of the sort
of political attention that is paid to migrant communities, especially children of migrants. The
rights and well-being of migrant children or children from migrant homes has tipped a number of
discussions about fair educational opportunities for migrant children. The well-being of these
families is firmly shaped by policies directed at immigrant communities. (Johnson 2007).
It is well known that a significant number of children from migrant families in China are
not able to attend public schools. This is due to the fact that they lack local Hukou registration
and therefore can not take advantage of the benefits afforded through the public school system.
This then, forces these children to turn to privately-operated schools or they are left behind
entirely. (Cheng & Feng 2013).
A number of studies have asserted that the HS is an institutional form of discrimination
against rural-urban migrants. It has also been revealed that there are considerable socioeconomic
and social disadvantages to being institutionally excluded Bia the HS. One of the main
disadvantages for the children include poor academic performance which impacts their prospects
later in life. In a report put out by (Zhou & Yang 1999) it was found that migrant status has a
dramatic effect upon the academic results of children when you compare them to those “leftbehind”. Despite this, it is common knowledge that migrant children perform significantly worse
than local urban children and that the achievement gaps widen when we start to look at the level
of segregation based on Hukou status. This segregation is perpetuated by studies that have found
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that he mixing of school populations has a negative effect on the local kids more than the migrant
children. (Xu & Wu 2016).
Similar to the United States, the pubic education system is delegated at the elementary
level to local government at the county/district level. Funding for these institutions is distributed
in reference to the number of children officially registered with proper Hukou. Consequently, the
authorities do not have the resources to accommodate the additional needs of non-registered
migrant children. Though the central government has made reforms and pushed for inclusion in
the public education system, there are a number of problems that prohibit such a clean transition.
This results in social exclusion of migrant children, discrimination, loneliness and more
institutionally, segregation. All of these factors hinder the ability for the school to properly take
care of the children while hindering the ability of the children to function properly within the
school day. (Guo Yu, Zhao Liqiu 2019).
These children when compared to local children have a much higher risk of externalizing
problems, having self-injurious thoughts and behaviors that are otherwise detrimental to their
mental and physical well-being. (Lu et al., 2018). Additionally, migrant children have poorer
developmental, emotional and psychological health based on a report conducted by Li and Jiang
in 2018. (Li & Jiang, 2018; Ni, Chui, Ji, Jordan, & Chan, 2016).
Post-compulsory education is often ignored when discussing migrant children but due to
the fact that many of them fall behind in elementary school they are less likely to pursue
secondary education. They also tend to fall beneath the benchmark exam requirements. Not to
mention, even if they excelled at the previously mentioned, they would still lack a Hukou
designation that would allow them to enter a secondary institution. Similar to the U.S. there have
been studies that show the effect of desegregation for black students and in China the story is
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much the same. While the situation is not necessarily race-based the social segregation or even
economic segregation has the same deleterious effects. Efforts have been made to use the data
found in these studies, but there is worry that bringing in migrant students could have a negative
impact on the local students that are properly documented.
It seems that the data is there in terms of the cost-benefit analysis of desegregating
Chinese schools but the meritocracy that often dictates this discourse amongst administrators and
local parents seems to make it rather difficult to see a future where there is a clean reform. While
there have been reforms in favor of the migrant student, they have come too few and far
between. This has implications for yet another generation of migrant children who will no doubt
grow up in an education system hostile to their growth and achievements.
With regard to the rural-urban migrant that I have reviewed in this section there is one
point that I would like to clarify. The market is not necessarily to blame for the treatment of
migrants and their necessary shedding of rights and privileges. The market acts as any other
driver of migration. It is explained easily through push-pull theory. Migrants are attracted to the
urban areas for their economic opportunity, but they shed their rights out of necessity due to the
rules that the HS has in place to guard against rural-urban migration.
In short, the only way to avoid surveillance and detection is to become a ghost. “Ghost”
in this context merely means that they are now people without rights and protections and that in a
world governed through courts and institutions, to have no rights or protections is to be dead in
the eyes of the state.
It is true that rural-urban migration did not necessarily start with Deng Xiaoping’s
opening up to the markets of the west. But it is impossible to ignore the role that rapid
industrialization has had on wages. Better wages is attractive in and of itself. Keep in mind that
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as an economy grows its urban centers grow and become prosperous. Prosperity in this sense
entails a lot. Better policing, healthcare, access to jobs and education, freedoms to pursue
creative and individualistic endeavors that would otherwise be stifled in the agrarian
communities that comprised so much of China since 1949. All of this pulls the migrant in and all
of this legitimizes their decision to shed their rights and protections by becoming “floating
migrants”. Though the decision is not necessarily easily made or happy in its outcome.
A Quick Comparison of Case Studies I & II
Looking back on the two cases examined in the second and third part of this article, there
are a number of inferences one can draw about the HS and its application to these two
subsections of the Chinese population. Firstly, in the case of the Uyghur people of Xinjiang, the
HS is indeed used as a social control mechanism but more so as an extension or vestige of the
colonial/imperial era of China. The historical context is really what allows the CCP to continue
hostile policies against the Uyghur people. The policies left over by dynastic China and the ROC
have maintained a status of disadvantage for the Uyghur people that CCP leadership has
exploited for a number of reasons ranging from geopolitical strategy to national identity and
propaganda. This is likely to remain unchanged due to the fact that there is very little the
international community can do in order intervene in Xinjiang.
In the case if the floating migrants of mainland China, we see a number of systematic
exclusions perpetrated against migrants via the HS. What is unique about this context is that
while the CCP has maintained its stance on the HS being used as a tool to mitigate the effects of
hitting the LTP, in reality it has had the duplicitous effect of leaving a vast swath of the
population underserved and trapped in a cycle of disenfranchisement that is bound to last
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generations barring any comprehensive reform of the HS. Due to the necessity for the CCP to
keep a hold on Xinjiang in the wake of unrest, there is little chance that there will be the
necessary reform in the mainland as well as Xinjiang.
Final Conclusion
The PRC has always acted with imperialist/colonial intent; this is why the Hukou System
is used the way it is and the case studies highlighting its effects on the Uyghur people of
Xinjiang as well as Han peoples in the mainland testify to this. While the first two uses I propose
in the first part of my thesis are both projected by the PRC while simultaneously being plausible
or even true, the underlying currents and uses of the program support my assertion of its colonial
and bio-political nature.
The effect this system has had on the Uyghur people of Xinjiang is both detrimental to
the Uyghur people on a Human Rights level as well as a greater societal level threatening not
only the way of life but the very existence of the Uyghur within the PRC. This is unlikely to
change since the greater international community holds very little geopolitical leverage against
the PRC to force a change in policy practice. With regard to the Han economic migrants, the
effects of the system are less dire but nonetheless force migrants to strip themselves of their
protections as citizens to a great extent.
This is problematic and once again is unlikely to change unless there is comprehensive
reform of the Hukou System. While the opening of the PRC to global markets was seen as a
great leap forward for the PRC it has had the duplicitous effect of incentivizing this shedding of
rights by becoming a “floating migrant” in search of economic opportunity in the urban areas of
the PRC. The case studies and archival data support both realties for the people themselves but
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also of the duplicitous nature of the Hukou. It also helps to support the assertion with the help of
the post-colonial theoretical framework I use that the PRC’s aim and policy practice are designed
with colonial or imperialist agendas. These realities have profound consequences for human
rights and migrant protections not only in China but other developing nations that wish to
possibly implement the Chinese model of migration governance or governance in general.
In a world where mass migration is becoming more commonplace, researchers have to
begin to look down the barrel at the longterm. China is a world leader and has great influence on
many of its neighbors. As we see factors such as war and climate change drive migrants across
international borders, we will see a great rush to close up or seal those borders. Much in the way
that the United States militarized their borders we will see countries around the world mimic this
strategy.
What worries me, and what should worry other migration scholars is who the role models
are. In regions stretching from the east coast of Africa to the frigid waters of New Zealand, there
are hundreds of millions of people that are at risk of displacement. If China, the role model for
much of this region, sets the tone with policies that mirror Uyghur imprisonment and
undocumented disenfranchisement then there is reason to believe that some countries would
follow suit. If the world follows in the footsteps of Fortress Europe, the U.S. Southern Border
and of Authoritarian China, then there is much to worry about when we discuss the future of
global migration governance.
The last point I would like to address, and one that fundamentally ties into the entire
mission of the paper explores how it is that a system such as this is able to persist within a global
human rights based governance regime. While it is obvious that the People’s Republic of China
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does not fall under the category of a liberal democracy as we understand it here in the United
States or even across the Atlantic in a number of countries, there is more to it than authoritarian
leadership versus democratic leadership. A system such as the HS fundamentally is not so
different from global migration regimes across the planet, the main difference being its scope. As
an internal system, it does not get netted into the “national security” narrative that nations such
as the United States use to justify its militarization of the border and its use of exclusionist
policies for outsiders.
The reason I bring this up is to highlight the role that human rights and international
governing bodies play in enforcing human rights standards especially within a migration context.
Due to the fact that the PRC is an autonomous country, and due to the fact that the laws and
policies it chooses to enact do not cross international boundaries, there is very little international
governing bodies can do to stop the human rights abuses that are occurring within Xinjiang.
There is also little it can do to address the plight of the migrant worker within the PRC even if
their individual rights (international human rights standards) are being trampled upon. Autonomy
trumps international intervention or standards so this is a conundrum that does not seem to have
an end at hand.
Another point I would like to stress on this issue comes with addressing the internal
factors that allow such a system to persist. This ties back to the nation-building and national
mythos that I discussed at the beginning of this article. It is apparent that the PRC, led by the
CCP, has gone through very extensive and elaborate efforts to fuse together a narrative that
justifies its behavior and treatment of Uyghurs and “floating migrants” around the country.
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By merging together Confucian ideology, imperialist nationalism, ethnopopulism, and
selecting geography and histories that support claims to lands such as Tibet and Xinjiang, the
CCP has effectively cushioned any ideological process to change from happening. When
compounding this with extensive internal surveillance, policies and laws that make it very
difficult to assemble politically or even in some cases socially, there is little that the average
Chinese citizen can do to petition change or reform of a system so pervasive in the day to day
life in China.
This is not by accident, and there are consequences that many researchers in the West do
not completely understand. When a government infuses meritocracy, one-party rule, and social
structures that restrict deviancy in the political sense, there are vast implications for human
rights, not only within China but also in the surrounding region. This is what researchers and
policymakers must keep their eye on when addressing China and it is something that migration
researchers must investigate, because throughout the course of this research it has become
apparent that the right to movement, regardless of distance, is something that is very closely tied
to freedom, progression and ultimately, justice.
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